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I INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this pa~~r is on one of the central procedural 
powers of the criminal law - arr est without warrant . As a 
legal c oncept the justified detention of an individual 
against their will is one of the more controversial . This 
is because its basis and content can be seen as a compro~ise 
between two fundamental derrocratic desires, one for maximum 
individual freedom , and the other for effective crime 
control . 
The law oi' arrest is an atte:-::;pt to reach the opti11u':l 
equilibriu~ between these t~o desir~s, and as such arises 
out of conflict . Paving arr~st e~codied in le[~lity is 
frequently perceived as an atte--:~t to r.i:ii~i.se t"L' i-:1];osj_tion 
and arbitraryness of it occure~c • , yet 7ax!~ise the ' just ' 
nature of the substa~tive la1 it e .,.,"'."'l;.·j ::.~r:-... \., ., ._ ... 
However , an E'n8lish soci.)los:-i_.::,1.,, .,r Jo~ e:::n ::c 
of the law would have lts adhe:·3nts bclteveo 
, 
'ar~et · 
fu:-ther contend.:, that the f~i::..ur e of tr-.e .s::·.,ts ::1 to a.d~:er? 
to the rl":e: .... crj_c is "!ot tte reE 1~: o.r tf~e ~-- v.;+~r~'"~ ac\.i"?~:--:_e~ 
o f those at :.:: t'Stt', 
anc, le::iti1:.iseci by the sta:cs hierarcl:y . 
It is the uestio~ of whether such prc~o~itio~s arc 
equally ap!)2.i::able to ~Tew ~eal·ind tbat will be considcre. 
here . 
As such th:..s parer v:.i.l::. at:,e·rp'.: to di2cover what i~ ::e':, 
Zealand is acc ~ptcd as a la~~ul exercis. of the power ta 
arrest , a .d whether t his ac~Jality o f th e law is &S out 
of step with its rhetoric a," it:, :"3ritish counterpart L-
clai~.~ed to be . 
[ 
3 
Such an enquiry is particulDrly r elevant given that the 
Justice Do.partment is currently reviewing t he Crimes Act 
1961 , the main, but not exclusive , source of arrest powers . 
As submissions on the possible reform of the arrest power3 
may suffer the sa~e f ailings as their counterparts in 
Britain , by bein~ based on assu~ptions of the law , it is 
hoped that the following discussion may assist in the 
rationalisation , and fruitfulness of the debate . 
Of course , should it be fcu~d that there is an institution-
alised 'gap ' betw~en the actuality of the law and its 
rhetoric, that ~i~ding can be us 0 d as a basis for q1cstionin~ 
the politicc of tte law at a ~acrs - l~vel . 
~hus, to provid9 that basis ani an a~char nc~~t ~o::-
discu=sions on the refor~ of the law of arr2st, thi= par2r 
will conside!' : 
iJS e 
tr.e 
whether thn law ~acches it s rhetoric . 
- desi::-aolo ref'Jr"1s . 
Most analys2s of thA power to arr'?st 
discretion - 11 Ar.y con3table ••• ~ 
4 
focus on its i~plicit 
;:, 
arrest", ..... and atter.:pt 
to explain why an arrest is made in one situation but not 
in another sir:iilar one . As a ::.~erul t there is a flood o f 
litcrature3 att0!'lptinG to exnlai:-. '.V),y seg:'.le:-its of society 
are disproportionately arrested ~ Such eyplanations ar8 
derived fro"'l er:mirical evidenco. gathsred on Police int:t?r -
action with th8 influgnces that prey upon when in thA 
exercisi~g of t~~ir di3cretio~ . 
it -, r ..I....J 
their au~hor~ty) . 
l ..., "' 
<.... • ' 
,...,...,... ,. 
(".t .I.._ 
all be co~si}ercd . 
-J :' :10 t ·.·:r.a t 
cou_d 
rc1theY' ,~.rhat t.hCJ" :i~r; : .. :? 0 \32.l~/ al~·J',\"t:d c1.rld e~·~7"P t,t:)d to iC , 
provides a!'l :1ccur:1-:~ ':('"i e . .,.t fo~ G:"':~ 1 i:liscu0~~i'"'~ of a!::/ 
of ~ssu~ntion~ as o t }i e c o n 1: c :1 : o f the 1 er," • 
I 
I 
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But McBarnct ' s intent ion was to do mo r e than this. It was 
to allow "a dir ec t entree into the nature of the law 
it self , and the judicial and political elites who make 
it a nd main taj n i l 11 • 6 ThiG would be achieved by 
atte mp ti ng to match up the law's actuality with its 
r hetoric . The rhetoric being the i QaEe held out of the 
law to the public , by the la':r itself, and its agent::; , 
by a process of mystification e (Thus it would be more 
appropriate to consider the laws embodyrnent of its mystique) c 
It is th e ma~chtng of the actuality of the law with its 
mystique , and even the desirability of such a match that 
is rel e ant for t, his paper ' s co!lclusi0n as to ref or·~. 
The general the,.1e of th~ law , :-'.c?n.rr..•=t c~~~:d':ls the ·nyst~que 
surgests , is that ti~ law is an atte~pt to li~it the 
i mposition of the stat2's aut~ority ontJ its ci~ize~s . 
This the~e is achieved by six ~ain conceuts : 
1. That arres t powers are clearly stated; 
2 . That arrest~ are on:y ~ade in relat~c~ to a 3~eci~ie~ 
offence; 
3. That incri~i~ating evi~e~c2 
:Jf:>f.:irr.: an ar:rest for it ea: be r:;adc; 
l
. ,~ ,, 
h • T l 1 at t. }1 e o fen c e s the :r. s e l \re s are c 1 ear· 1 y d. e f i 11 e et ; 
) . T!'-:at a~, arrestee can resist Rn UYJ'-.a·:1 '.:':"1::. '-'l...:T }t--:,; 
6. That al: arr~st3 are acc,~~tahle . 
r elation to .:ew Zec:.J.and law in Pa:::- .. I I of this r~ape!' . 
~c Barnet found that the phencmcnon of an individual unwill -
ingly ' helping the Police with their enq1i=ies ' rlc~rly 
indi-: a ted a ' gap ' between tte 5r i. tish law of arrest anci 
its ~ystique . Such a d~tention was r eally a de facto 
arrest , 
o.f.':ence 
which even i~ it was in relation to a specific 
still contra~ted sharply wi:h the mystique . Indeed 
a strone; arguinent could be made that the ' arrest' wac foT 
the purposes of obtainin5 incri~inatins evi.dencc . 
r 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
[ 
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The Major clash ~c3arnet found in such situations between 
tr.e law and its r.:ystique was that the 'arrest' was routinely 
interpreted by th0 courts as not b0ing an arrest, de jure 
or de facto, but rather 'voluntary' assistance. 
Even in cases ~her e arrests were ~ade, purportedly in law, 
th~ court= would str0ruously adsert that t~ey were lawful, 
de2uitc nu:-:erou3 br2acr:es in the ':'ystici_ue such as gensrJl 
arrests with charges decided later and eve~ where arrests 
we re made , o o b ta i n in c ~~ i ~: j -1 G t i n ~ 0 v i :! e n c e • 
But eve~ such li~ited efforts tow~rdc ac-ount~b:litJ ~~re 
case, c~a~ ]S of 3uc.2~s ~er2 r ,. '\ ,_ ") . ., . 
~,1~ilc '."') . .,. .... -.: "'" .-. ··--v-· , l ·:c .. s 
.. ,.. 'Y' , ...... .. 
~ - • l.., t~a-, 
of :'c1~c e ~ 
exa::.plcs 
.., .:-, -:- r' ".:I 
\.,I - .., • .1 l~'= "C.-. ••• , ... ; !.. ")-,.,.; ... , • .; .;.--.., -·· .. - J - .. - .. ,. • • - ., • 
_., -.:i .... ..: .,... ~,., _, .... -·:. 
... \ . .1,/ 
(;µj_!~~ '"'~. ~-.. ,r".; .:?0 ~·0::-' 1,.:.3-·~1·/: . '~.1. -:-"1r·-r,c-2~-' ..... ":s ... ,- , 
: ' ~ et 3 r-~ :-' ·~· ": :-i_ : !i '.I }i C? : £l ~~ :r . : : :; 3. "': , ~ :'G .. "~ r\ :' :_ =. . '" ·1 C • " -. : :-~ e • . 
Ctl:_r-'!"·'-=-~·-, :.: ... __ :)Y>':'::t:; :r:.at :")u:~ ·:e tL . :_ . .,. ,."'. u,.. ___ 
b~";'J.(i~ ... •• : ~- 1.~) ,'tP<.iT'"'~S"•,-. 
mhcr,c "/P~e aJ_-1 01"I'r:,y,""'C "lhe~e tl1e Sl.,._"pc+·,·rs :'ol;ce 10.,.~_,·~;_·o.n ....... ,.., ~ ..I.. ..1. ... .1. .. v\ . ,:u,_. •i vv .. I.,~ .. - .1.---· --- -
to arrest ~as eq 1atnd with ~~  GUb~tantive la~ a~ct 
reoui0it~ ~viJence. 
Another ~ar~inal o~fence, obscruct!on, had been held to 
be ' "the doin,; c: ·:i.n.y :ict 1:hic!l '".:i.:-;:cc; i •.1or8 difficul: :or 
tr:c ?"'~ice to carry out :i_ '"'." duty', a'1d r-:igr.t incl'ld:2 
:Ji'"ply rr:fu:;in., t n .:rn:-'.ve_ any ._u,istic~::-, and af'.y sarca3r:-:~18 
·:or i .s i t d :. f i' ~ c cl 1. t "-c 'to ve fro :ri t r: e ' i n no c e n t ' a c t 3 
7 
That there ar~ such ' obscure ' offences would indicate that 
it would be difficult for an indivi1ual to know whether 
they were being lawfully arrested or not, and thus whether 
they were entitl0d to resist . 
Thus 'Ic3arnet held the wide body of discretion with 1 it tle 
apyiar r:r. t f•J ttcrir,G, gran t.ed to the Folic e th rou[h vac:ue 
substa~tive laws and wide proc8dural powers did lit~le to 
assert the laws links with its ~ystique . 
Put this de ~ee of diGcr~tio~, ~cnarret not.~d, wa2 ~ot 
gai~ed c~rreptitious_y by the Felice, ~ut WBS f or7all y 
allocatJd by ~0 ~riti~h ?arlia~ent . 
.:actor,: 
ccn-::e::t 
i+-.-,"-" _t..,.._,_, __ , 
that :1.ot o.::J.: 
-;v, .. ·r,."Y'\.-, +...:nr ' ct __ ,. .. ,.,. __ ,.,v_,_ >, 
i Y• - r..1 .,.... ""l - i '"" Y"l _._ '1 .- ) r • - .• v .... ., - ....... ..,; -· .• "'" .... 
-: :.d .... ', .-. ,l_._ - .; •· ... ~ ' 
.; -- -l. ,, p, '.., _, - . , c; . ~· ' 
. . ... - ,,,.. -.. - ..... ,.. 
......... - ..... \ '<.~ .. - ...... , 1 -y,, - • ... _._ ~ ... I.,__, • 
::i ._:ht ~~ fuse- to 
their actL:n.::: , :::i::(l r~c}d tr.e•~. r1~r~;or:< .. J.'/ ~2spo.'.:0iol;_; : or 
an." i""lfri~.;:2.:!.er1: '):~ t1 ltr'; 1 ~,r1::2:: : , ~r.:.::-; t!:ar. c2.t:·1.r . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Of course this poj_nt does ts;1d to u;1derc.".i?1e ::c:7arYJet ' s 
thesis so·-:e·:;l-:at in that if the Police (and even elenents 
of fue judiciary) .:tr"' unsure as to the st~r:dir:g of tho law 
of arr-est , it is likc:y tho.t they wj2.l be ir:ibued with tt:e 
sa~e my~tique as he public . rans2quently cons t ables 
would be unlikely to act to ~ho full extent of their poITers 
her contentions as to tre extc:1sive li:nits of law arc re:=tl , 
and hav. on Gccosion been u3ed , but pos-ibly they ar~ the 
ezc nntions rather than tic rule . 
' L::.. t: I plD.J';Y'..:; 
...... ' l +- """,... • ;,.., . ,. ... 
) \. ~ "' ... t. .., .L .. t,;' ~ 
- ,,_ "I""\ Y" ""' .... 1"' ...... ~ · ...... ...... ~ .... 
- c . ..... - . ..., .; .., • - •' 
-: , : r. -
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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III ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT - THE LAW . 
In New Zealand , unlike Englanct 9 the power to arrest without 
warrant is solely statutory. Thus, for a valid arrest 
the provisions of the arrest power must be strictly complied 
with -
"The power to arrest an individual, thereby denying 
the freedom of that arrested individual, is on~ 
which must be exercised in strict accordance with 
the law " 10 
The power to arrest in criminal matters rests only in 
Police constables, and any person they may call to their 
assistance. 
The main provisions providing f or criminal arrest a~e 
found in section 315(2) of the Cri~es Act 1961 , which 
must be read in conjunction with certain justifications 
contained in Part III of fue Act - ~atters of Justific ation 
or Excuse . 
Any constable •• • may arrest ••• an y p9rson whco he 
find s disturbing the public peace or c omrr.:L t·U.ng dl~Y 
offence punishable by death or imprison:n'9nt. 
ihis is the sole remai~der of the sc ca::ed ' 0~ view 1 
absolute arrest powers of section 315(2), the ethers being 
repealed and replaced by sect ion 39( I) and (2, of the 
Summary Of fences Act 1981. 11 The new ' on view: arrest 
. 
1 
I I 
power is no anger absolu~e, but contains a qualification~ 
By classifying section 315(2) (a) as 'abso lute' i.:- meD.nt, 
that it does not prima facie provide for the arr &s ting 
constable to make a mistak e as to whether the person 
arrested had in fact committed the offence arrested for • 
(For reasons of ease of analysis and understanding ~ this 
p ower, and later that of section 315(2)(b), wj_ll be con-
sidered independently of any effect of provisions in Part III 
of the Act) . 12 
r 
[ I 
[ I 
r. I 
[ I 
E I 
[ 
[ 
I 
f I . 
l 
(Similarly, the consequences of the incorporation of 
'disturbing the public peace' in the power will be 
considered in juxtaposition with section 315(2)(b)'s 
'breach of the peace').i3 
10 
Section 315(2)(a), if taken in literal terms, is an arrest 
power of the pure form expected in a society that stresses 
individual freedom. That is, an individual can only be 
detained by the state if they have actually committed an 
offence that allows for the deprivation of liberty . 
Thereby matching the claim that it is only acceptable for 
'wr ong- doers to have their freedom cur ailed. 
It would seem doubtful whether there is any current 
practical need for section 315(2)(a) . Any offence for 
which this power authorises an arrest is also covered by 
section 315(2)(b ) . Ho wever, despite the immediate advan-
tages of arresting under an express qualified power , the 
Police continue to use section 31 5 (2 ) (a ) . 
!~deed it is likely that shoul d th e Pol ice de cline t o use 
section 315(2)(a) in 'found c om mi ~t ing ' si t uations, it 
would not find judicial favour. This is bec a use it would 
clearly be contrary to the le gislatu r es intention, which 
saw fit to distinguish betwe e --i I f ou r~ .i cc ·r:r.,ic :. ing ' and 
' go od cause to s us pect' s i tuations . I ndeed ttere were , 
and are, clear policy reasons f or ~aki~g a~r es ts under 
s ection 315(2)(a ) absolute . Those be ing first, tha t as 
the constabl e has perceived the action jud ged t o be a 
crime there is less risk of a mistake n arrest than if 
c ire ums tan tial and hearsay ev id '= ne e was needed to be c o n-· 
sidered . Second , that as the judgement of the act as an 
offence is solely the arresting co nstable ' s, they should 
assume the responsibility for it. 14 
Therefore being a prima facie absolute power , a lawful 
arrest would appear to occur only when an offence had 
been found to be occurring and the individual arrested 
was committing ite 
r 
r 
r 
[ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
r I 
I 
I 
r 
Consequently three issues of interpretation arise: 
1. What do the words '1 finds committing" imply? 
2 . Who must find the offender? 
3. At what stage must the arrest be made? 
1. 11 Finds c ommi tt ing", 
This j_ssue can itself be spli t into two .subsidiary 
questions: 
(a) What is it n~cessary to do to 'find' a person 
committing an offence? 
(b) Does ' committing' require actual guilt? 
1 1 
(a) In a recent Court of Appeal judgment, Police v . 
Carter 15, a definitive statemen t ~as given as to the 
circumstances in which a person can be said to be 'found'. 
Based on the ordinary meaning of the word, the Court 
decided a person may be 'f our.d I if 'seen I j I discovered', 
'come upon' or otherwise 'perc eived ' . The Court agJ-':>ed 
with .1r Justice Mahon in 2..t. v,. Ot.'.::::1.. 16 Viho concluried that 
mere ~roof of guilt by infcre~ce er ad~ission is i~~uff-
icient to 'find' someone i~ a situa~~Jn !Ls e~ ~ &n ~ff2~:e, 
or committing an offence. 
The Court of Appeal i ~ an obiter statement also agreed 
with the ratio from f.l_c l\s nzie v .. PcL'~ce ._ 17 rtat case 
arose out of a constable call::.ng 0:-1 >:c:<'.:c.r.:?.i.e, ,1.·hc had 
been indulging i~ drinK at his ~ome, and inviti~g ni~ to 
go to the Polj.ce station to be in~erviewed for some matter 
or other~ ~cKenzie agreed and foll~wed the cons table to 
the car . As soon as he errierged onto the footpath he was 
arrested by the car.stable and subsequently charged with 
1 f, being found drunk in a public place . 
Mr Justice Henry took the approach, later approved by the 
Court of Appeal, applying the ordinary meaning of 1 find 11 9, 
but he also indicated what the appropriate nature of the 
finder was to be 
"All the cases are instances where some viewer , 
unconnected with and not accompanying the person, 
perceives the person in the particular place". 20 
12 
'Particular plac~ also refers to the particular circumstances 
of the offence. 
Therefor e to ~ind' someone committing an offence there 
must be first , a perception of the act constituting the 
offenc e21 , and second , uninvolvement in the act itself 
by the finder~ other than as an observer . 22 
This first aspect is in accordance with the approach taken 
i n English courts23 but the second is not , and has in fact 
been specifically rejected. In Winzc1r v. ~_hief Constable 
of Ken t 24 , t he defendent had been removed from a public 
hospital by two constable s to its forecourt~ He was 
arrested and charged with being found drunk on a highway , 
an offence under section 12 of the Licensing Act 1872 . 
Thus the fact situation would appear identical to McKenzie . 
The court held that words 'fo~nd drunk' meant ' perceived 
to be drunk' . That Winzar's presence on the highway was 
the direct r es ult of the constables ' actions, and actually 
involuntary (unlike Yc Ke nz ie) was held t o be irrelevant. 
Thus the McKenzie decision as to fue nature of the finder 
as approved by the Court of Appeal in Q~rter, finds no 
support in the 2~gl ish courts. 
Indeed this '~c[enzie aspect is likely to create difficulties 
for the PoliceG This di~ficulty will arise with Police 
use of 'agent provocateu~s' who, by participating in the 
offence , could not be said to 'find ' the offence being 
c ommitted . 
This is not the situation in Can~da, where the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta25 rejected the 
argument that ' find' precludes any participation by the 
arrestor in the offence. This principle was extended to 
c over situations where an individual may ' find ' another 
assaulting him . 26 
13 
If in New Zealand the Police use the agent provocateur , 
who , because of c oncern of proof or the offender escaping , 
a rrests unde r se c tion 315(2)(a) as ' finding' t he offence 
being committed , it has been suggested27 that the Courts 
may take the broad Canadian view of 'find' and restrict 
McKenzie to its facts . 
However , given that McKenzie was a clear case of an agent 
provccateur and has subsequently been approved by the 
Court of Appeal , it would seem unlikely that it could be 
restricted . 
(b) A lj_teral reading of section 315(2)(a) '.s 'finds 
committing ' would require that the arrested person have 
actually been offending. Hence i£ a constable arrested 
someone who was later found not to have committed an of fence 
there would then have been an unlawful arrest, and the 
constable would not have been acting in the execution of 
duty. 
However, there is a large body of English authoriLy that 
runs contrary to such an orthodox reading cf acsolute 
arres~ powers . The English courts are not adverse to the 
reading in of a qualification such as 'apparently' or 
'appears on reasonable grounds to be' committing ar offence, 
in those powers which allow for arrest in situations of 
flagrant delicto,(where the offence is in the process of 
being committed) . 
Whether a New Zealand court would follow such a lead in 
any interpretation of section 315(2)(a) is questionable . 
It is hoped that the following synopsis of the principal 
cases will show that the English situation is sufficiently 
removed from that here to deter such interruptive licence 
being taken with legislation . 
The initial case was Trebeck v . Crect~28 where 'apparently' 
was read into a ' found committing' arrest power to prevent 
the ar~est being unlawful , thereby preventing a suit of 
false imprisonment being brought against the arresting 
constable . 
I 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
14 
The primary ~eason for the insertion of the qualification 
was that the constable acted to prevent what he saw as a 
potential danger to 'life or limb I situation arising -
an 'apparently' drunk cab driver. The court conceded 
that this warranted prompt action with the requirement 
of proof of guilt on the suspect's part being unlikely 
to be acquired by the constable before public safety 
would have been compromised. 
Thus the lesser requirement of a reasonable belief in a 
state of facts, which if true would have ensured a lawful 
arrestj was irr,ported into the arrest power. 
This decision 'bound ' a later court Wiltshire v. Barrett29 
to read in a qualifj_cation to another absolute arrest 
power dealing with drink-driving. 
However, between these two cases there had been an 
extension of the Trebeck principle , that of reading in a 
qualification in ' public 3afety 1 sit~aticns , to that of 
mere 'public interest 1 
The Court in Isaacs v. 
situations suci as 'importuning',. 
3r Keech~ mace that extension b2c~us~ 
it mistakenly believed itself bound by Tr ebeck . 
These three cases all involved the court reading i~ a 
qualiftcation to act as a ' shieJ.=· ' for the arrestir:g 
constable, from a claim of false impriscnment and assaul~ . 
However, a pinnacle ~as been reached with the fourth 
case in the series, '!Jills v. Bowlev31 • The House of Lords, 
in a majority decision, decided to provide a qualification, 
no~ for a 'shield' but a 'sword' so that charges resuJting 
fro m an otherwise unlawful arrest could be pressed. 
The appellant had been arrested for using obscene language 
in a publj_c place, under a 'found committing' arrest 
power32 and had assaulted the three constables 'detaining' 
her. 
[ 
[ 
[ 
c. 
I 
l 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
15 
At trial she was acquitted of the obscene language charge33 
but convicted of assaulting constables in the execution 
of their dutyo The court also found that the arresting 
constable honestly and reasonably believed that the 
appellant was committing the offence arrested for. 
It was accepted by all parties that the convictions could 
only stand if the arrest was lawfu1. 34 Thus the question 
for the House was 'whether the true construction of section 
28 was that it was an absolute or qualified arrest power 9 I • 0 
The majority found the power to be qualified, and read an 
allowance for an honest mistaken belief based on reasonable 
grounds. Lord Bridge saw this conclusion as giving the 
correct expression of the l egislatur e 's intention in 
enactiI'-g section 28, 
11Parliar;1e n t in enacting any sue h provision must 
have i;iter.c:. ed that any person who was committine; any 
of t he specifj.ed offences, whethe r serious or t rivial , 
shoul,i oe a!Tes ::,ed and brcught to justice'' 35 
For this intention to be realised it was claimed that the 
a:r-restor needed prr)\:ection, from civil suits, and as in 
this case, 
11 a gainst viole nt resistance to reasonable force whic r. 
a person exerc ising a lawful power of arrest is 
encitled to us e in order to effect and mainta.1.n hie 
arrest. If the protection the law affords is con-
tingent and unpredictable, how can Parliament 
reaso nably have expected anyone to rely on it" 36 
Thus it was contended the legislature must have intended 
to grant some protection to an arresting constable. This 
was especially so where the constable was under a duty to 
arrest37 , which if neglected could have resulted in the 
impositio!l of criminal sanctions. Lord Bridge was sure 
that the legislature would not have expected a constable 
to have to choose between a possible unlawful arrest and 
a criminal neglect of duty. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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That only protection would in accordance with the current 
'crop' of arrest powers38 result from an "honest belief 
on reasonable grounds that he has observed the commission 
of a relevant offence by the person he arrests 11 • 39 Thus 
Lord Bridge held section 28 did incorporate a qualification 
that acted as a protection for a constable who had made an 
honest and reasonable mistake . 
Eis Lordship considered that little harm would result 
from such an interpretation, as an individual so arrested 
was required to be taken 'forthwith' be fore a jus U.c e, 
who could more appropriately consider the matter . 
A question can be raised as 
behind Lord Bridges reading 
created a lawful arrest.40 
to the 'just Lee' of the i1:1petus 
in of a protection, that 
It is doubtful that severe 
consequences would have arisen if the arre s t had been 
unlaw f ul, possibly an action in tort, but had the arrest 
been honest and reasonable, the damages would have been 
unlikely to be more than nominal . Nhat was mere important 
c1nd possibly the nizj)r influence on Lord Br::dge v,as ttat an 
essential ingredient of the offence th e appeal was bn; was 
that the constable have acted lawfullyo Surely thoug~ , 
had the appellant's actions in assaulting the constable 
been less than reasonable ~ as Lord Bridge appears to 
intimate , a conviction for common assault would have he~n 
an acceptable vindication of the c onstables actio~s. 
Lord ~owr~ in dissent, took a mor e orthodox approach to 
the interpretation of section 28, applying basic princi pJes 
of statutory construction, 
11 (i) Words should, where possible be construed in 
their ordinary me aning; 
(ii) Additional words ought not to be read into a 
statute unle ss they are required to make the 
provisions intelligible; 41 
(iii) A provision creating a power or duty of 
arrest, particularly without warrant should be 
c9nstrue~ in favour of the liberty of the subject; 42 
(iv) A statute should he interpreted as making the 
least change in the law which is consistent with 
its meaning ." 43 
[ 
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A literal reading of section 28 reached the conclusinn 
that an arrest under it would only be lawful if the arrestee 
actually committed the offence arrested for. Lord Lowry 
then considere d whether there were sufficient grounds for 
departing from this interpretation , which was the result 
of the application of the rules of construction. 
The correctness of the decision in Trebeck was doubted, 
and like Wiltshire accepted as authority only for the 
reading in of a qualification in arrest powers that dealt 
with matters of potential danger to the public. They were 
to be regarded as exceptions to the rule, not examples of 
it. Isaacs, Lord Lowry considered, was wrongfully 
decided , relying on Tr~beck for a much wijer proposj.tion 
than the decision and dicta could support . 
" 'I1he co mbined weight of these three cases , two of 
which were 'drink and drive ' authorities , is in my 
opinion , quite inadequate to overcome the general 
principles of construction tc which I have referred" 44 
In reply to Lor d Bridge 's contention that the arresting 
constable needs protection, Lord Lowry affirmed that stauld 
the constable have acted honestly and reasonably 5 there 
were procedures for ensuring any action aris ing out of an 
unlawful arrest were not too ' painful ' e 
In concluding, his Lordship, thougL exp:- essive in the 
direction of his sympathies in the case, remained 
convinced that it was for the legislature not the c ourts 
to do the 'r ight thing ' by constablesQ The courts task 
was to apply the law as it was, not as they perceived it 
should be, 
" It is quite reasonable to argue that a constable ought 
to be regarded as acting in the execution of his duty 
if he arrests without a warrant a person whom he 
reasonably, but wrongly , believes to oe committing an 
offence against section 28 , but the proposition that 
he_is so actin g is not self evident. The conflict, 
which everyone has recognised in this case between 
public order and fue liberty of the subject is for 
Parliament to resolve, and not the court". 45 
I 
1 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
It is doubtful that the conclusion reached in Wills v. 
Bowley would have much influence on any interpretation 
of section 315(2)(a) , the legal context being alien to 
that of section 28 . 
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The New Zealand legislature have clearly indicated that it 
was not their intention for section 315(2)(a) to be 
qualified) as they have made it prima facie absolute, yet 
in the next paragraph expressly granted a qualification -
section 315(2)(b). In addition 5 as will be argued later
46 
an arrestor under section 315(2)(a) who acts unlawfully 
but makes an honest and reasonable mistake as to the 
commission of an offence and its perpetrator, will be 
justified in so arresting and not subject to criminal or 
civil proceedings . 
Thus following the Lord Lowry contention, and excepting 
the Lord Bridge ar gument as to providing a protsctj_on to 
47 
the Police from re sis tanc e, there are ins u f .:::.c ien t 
reaso~s to depart from a literal reading of 3ection 315(2)(a). 
2.. The firider, 
A literal readin g of section 315(2)(a) would see~ to 
:indicate that the legislature , by usin g th~ phr;sse 'he 
finds committing ', expressly en·;risaged the f:;_:1dsr to be 
t!le arrestor . 
In England t here is authority for the propositi on that tt2 
person who arrests a person under a 'found committing' 
power, need not be the one who found the offence being 
ccrnmitted. 
To achieve this result two methods have been used. The 
firs t
1
+8 inv olves the arrestor being perceived as acting 
as an agent for the finder49• The seconct50 acknowledges 
that the arrestor is the principal of the act, but whose 
involvement in the events from the actual 'finding' and 
arrest are so closely interrelated that the offence is 
deemed 'found being committed' by the eventual arrestor. 
[ 
• 
[ 
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The implications for section 315(2)(a) of such decisions 
arise from a Canadian decision, Frey v. Fedoruk51 that 
equated the expression 'he finds committing ' with 'found 
committing'. 
The Court cited with approval Hanway and Howarth and 
ad opted the broader approach of holding that in neither 
case was it necessru'y that the arrestor actually find the 
offence being committed. 
American courts have taken the same broad approach, using 
concepts simil:1r to those espoused in Hanwa,.Y and Howarth . 
5:, 
The primary case being Silverstei~ v. State L where it 
was held that a Police officer arresting an information 
from another officer of the same detail (squad - team) 
was acting as an agent of the finding officer . In a later 
case, Robinson ' • State53 , the prerequisite of the arrestor 
and finder being 't eam members' was deemed unnecessary if 
the non- finding but arresting officer was closely involved 
in the chase and apprehension of the offer:lier. 
It is wor th ncting that the sympathies of American courts 
frequently lie with the arrestor, as many quite serious 
offences are labelled 'misdemeanours' and are often only 
able to be arrested for unde.r· a 'found committing• 54powe::-- .. 
Compounding this is that society has changed markedly 
since the for~ulation of such powers . With the greater 
access to transportation , and urban anonymity , the ?clice 
task of apprehending offenders has been handicapped by 
their 'working conditions ', primarily procedural powers, 
being relics of the last century . As such the immediate 
Police pressures to remove such shackles is on those who 
control their use, the courts. 55 
It seems unlikely that arguments based on such authority 
would have much influence in ~ew Zealand . The Crimes 
Act's incorporation of section 315(2)(a) has occurred 
recently, and cannot be said to be an anachronism. 
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With respect to the court in Frey, it is contended that 
'he finds' has significantly different connotaU.ons to 
'found committing '. As such it is clear that it was me 
legislatures intention that the arr2sting constabl e be 
the one who found the offence occurring, whether it 
happened immediately, or after a chase. 
Nor are the public policy factors of effective crime 
control sufficient enough to do the necessary violence 
to section 315(2)(a)'s interpretation and justify th8 
inclusion of such concepts as, 'one continuous transaction' 
or 'communication of information from the finder to fue 
arrestor'. Such situations would provide the necessary 
good cause to suspect, thereby enabling an arrest to be 
made under section 315(2)(b). 56 
3. Ti~e of the arrest L 
'The phrasing of section 3i5(2)(a) :is.plies that should a 
constable find someone about tc comrni~ an of!ence , or in 
circu~stances that indicate an offence has just been 
completed then it cannot be used to make a lawful arrest. 
However , in the initial situation of f incj_ng someone about 
to Gommit an off0nce this may in fact be an offence in 
itself - an attempt . Section 72 of the ~rimes Act57 make& 
it an offe~ce to attempt to co ~mit an offe nce . Thus any 
person ' found ' at~e~pting to commit an uf: e nce, will, 
despite its non-completion, have been found committing ~he 
offence of attempt, and may be arrested under section 
315(2)(a) . 
Whether or not an act was in fact an attempt is a question 
of law. If the act arrested for is deemed not an attempt, 
then there will have been an unlawful arrest. 
In the second situation, where an offence has been committed, 
the instantaneous nature af many offences necessarily 
r equires that the offender be arrested subsequently. The 
arrest may even come as a result of an '1mmediate and fresh 
pursuit 11 • 58 
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Time is not the issue. If an offence is 'found' being 
committed and the circumstances between the finding and 
the eventual apprehension involve a continuity of action 
then an arrest under section 315(2)(a) will be lawful. 
Therefore, to sum up, to make a lawful arrest under 
section 315(2)(a) the arresting constable must perceive 
the offence occurring and be unconnected with that 
occurrence. Further, the offence must be proven in court, 
a mistake as to the accused's guilt - even if honest and 
reas onable - renders the arrest unlawfule Finally, the 
arrest must be made while the offence is occurring (for 
these purposes it should be noted that certain a~ts may 
constitute the offence of attempt) and after the offence 
has occurred, if the circumstances between the finding 
and arrest are an uninterrupted sequence of events .. 
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B. Section 3]7(2)(b), 
Any c onstable c•• may arrest ••• any per son whom he 
has good cause t o suspect of having committed a 
breach of the peace or any offence punishable by 
death or imprisonment . 
This is a ' qualified ' arrest powe½ meaning that constables 
who have ' good cause ' to ' suspect ' the person they have 
a r rested of committing an offence, even though they hadn ' t , 
will s t ill have made a lawful arrest . It ls contended 
that this sect:Lon also contains by implication , provi.sions 
that the ' good cause; to ' suspect ' also goes to the 
existence of an offence itselfo 59 
Unfortunately, the for~ula~ion of the qualification is net 
standard, being one of scveraJ that have been used by the 
legisla~ure . However , it has been recently repeated in 
section 39(1) of the Sum~ary Offences Act . Other exa~p:es 
of qualifications have inc~uded ' reasonable cause to 
believe ' - section 53A(~) of the Police Off~nces Ac~ 1 C'.?7 . 
/'- ' 
' reasonably suspect ed ' - s ectic~ 20 of the Firear~s Act 
1958; ' reasonably beli.eves' - section 39(2) of the Surmnary 
Offences Act; and 'reasonatls and probable grounds to 
believe ' - sectio~ 77(4) of the ?ire Services Act 1927 , 
and secticG 32 of ~he Cr ~~es Ac~. 
If a literal a~ur 0a~h wns taken t o the incerpre~a~ion of 
such pow8rs, on0 cold be f or given for believing that tne 
legislat~ro wa~ intending to establish different tests for 
each qualification . However in practical terms it seems 
unlikely that th~s was the case , but rather the result of 
drafting licence . Indeed this was the finding of ~r Justice 
North , in Police v . Anderson60 , who held that there was no 
significance in the variation between ' reaEonable cause ' 
and ' good cause '. Both were expressions of the reason-
a bleness of the 'belief' or ' suspicion '. 
However, a distinction has been drawn in the requirement 
established by legislation for ' belief ' and ' suspicion '. 
It arose from Seven Seas Publishing Coy v . Sulli~an61 a 
c ase dealing with an appeal against a search war rant . 
• 
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The warrant should only have been issued if there were 
'reasonabl e grounds for believing' the item being searched 
for was on the premises. The magistrate issuing the 
warrant had stated that there were 'reasonable grounds for 
suspecting' this was so. 
Although in reality this was probably merely a grammatical 
error, Mr Justice McGregor concluded that in law the 
Magis trate had adopted a lower test than required. There-
for e mo r e substantial grounds for forming a 'reasonable 
belief' are r eq1..j_red than for a 'reasonable suspicion'. 
Higher authority for such a contention is found in the 
j udgmen t of Lord Bridge in 'Nil ls v . Pc)\vl ey62 • In his 
reading in of a qualification into a prirna facie absolute 
provision ' belief 1 was preferred to the 'suspect' approved 
in Wiltshire v . qarrett 63 as it necessitated a higher 
standard for :he reasonable grounds to meet -
" The dist:::.nction may be a fine one , but when it is 
necessary to exce~d the amoit of an express statutory 
po~er of a~rest without warrant by the process of 
necessary iTiplication, I do not believe the implication 
should go any further than is strictly necessary tc 
make the statutory power work" 64 
It should be noted that the quoted qualificacion in the 
Police Offencec Act was replaced by the very qtalification 
in issue here, by secticn 30(1; of the Su~mary Offences Ac~, 
enacted after the Sever 3~2s decision . As such it ~ay oe 
argued that the legislature !'las endorsed r-".r Justice \:cGregor"s 
distinctj.on , and rreferred the lower standard of 'suspect' 
to that cf the higner 'belief'. 
Consequently , whi]e it would appear that ' good cause' 
equates with 'r easonable grounds' , a 's uspicion ' is easier 
to obtain than a ' belief '. 
The reason for the legislatures granting of a qualified 
arrest power is as a concession to the realities of police 
work • 
] 
] 
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The situation will often be such that the Police will be 
reliant on information from non-Police sources as to both 
the commission of an offence and the identity of its 
perpetrator. Often whether an offence has been committed 
will be apparent upon investigation. But it is so that 
the Police can act on information received, and not be 
held to have acted unlawfully, should a reasonable but 
honest mistake be made , that qualified arrest powers are 
provided. 
Such a concession is tempered by a possible judicial review 
of the lawfulness of fue arreste Such a review requires 
that what were the grounds of t~e suspicion be decided as 
a question of fact. Once such findings have been made , 
an objective determination by the Court is required as to 
whether such facts could have created the necessary sus-
picion in the reasonable person . The complexity of such 
an enquiry was stated by Xr Justice Turner, in Blundell 
v . Attor~ey-G~nerai . 65 
"T t is beyond doubt -chat ihe proper c::, use is f or t h2 
Judge to ask the jury such specific ques~ions of 
fact as he may consider necessary as to the ~atters 
of primary fact contended for on the evidence; and 
then, using the findings, it is fer the Judge to 
decide, perhaps as a matter of fact, perhaps as a 
matter of Jaw, perhaps as a mixed matter of fact and 
law, whether on the facts so found by the jury -cne 
constaole had reasonable and probable grounds for 
belief that t.he person arrested had corr_'Tii-cted an 
offence for which he (the cons-cable) had authority 
to arrest without warrant". 
Whethe r the constable believed there was good cause is 
not the issue. 66 Rather the issue is 1 would the reasonatle 
person with the constable's experience; and in the constable' s 
position , have suspected the arrested person of committing 
the offence arrested for•, 
This raises the issue of the nature bf a suspicion. Lord 
Devlin , using its ordinary meaning as a premise, stated it 
Er} to be · 
"a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is 
lacking ••• arising at or r.ear the starting point of 
an investigat ion of which the obtaining of prima 
facie proof is at the end" . 
] 
] 
] 
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Thus as our Court of Appeal has recognised in Police v . 
Cooper68 a lawful arrest may occur , even though the grounds 
on which it was based would be inadmissibl e as evidence , 
or would not themselves be suffic ient to sustain the charge 
for whic h fue arrest was made . 
It is implicit from Section 315(2)(b) , and the common law , 69 
that the grounds on which the suspicion was formed were 
known before the arrest and not subsequent to it . 
It is difficult (and not desirable) to attempt to establish 
in precise ter~s, the grounds that may cont~ibute to the 
formation of a suspicion . However , certain factors have 
often been acknowledged . 
First, 
70 Tuan · 
though 
previous convictions . Lord Wright in :1cArdle v ,. 
accepted that the previous canvictio~s of a suspect, 
~ot decisive in themselves, were an acceptable 
,-, ' 
fact or to be considered in the for!nation of a suspicion. ' 1 
Second, hearsay evidence/information fro~ third parties. 
In New Zealand information of thic type has been accepted 
as being able to create the necessary reas onable grounds 
to believe , required for the issuing of a s~arch warrant. 
As ;~r Jus · ice Hutchison stated in Inglew ::-·oJ Servic e!ne ns 
Club nc . v . ~auriri, 72 
"I see no reason why a Jus U .c e should not be s a t L:, : ied 
by certain hearsay evidence that there is reasona~!e 
grounds to believe that there was an offence occur::: ::..ni;". 
A similar approach would surely be taken if the issue arose 
with r egard to an arrest . 
However, acceptance of such grounds creating a reasonable 
suspicion is coupled with an assessment by the constable 
cf the reliability of the infcr~ation . Thus the issue for 
the arresting constable ls twofold : what is the content 
of the information and what is its credibili t y . 
1 
1 
I 
I 
] 
] 
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A third fact or connected with the second is information 
received by a fellow c onstable ~ Mr Justice Hutchison 's 
judgrnent also assists here in th at t he 'hearsay ' evidence 
received came from a constable. His Eonour contended that 
ther e was no reason why t he constable's information itself 
would not be sufficient to create a reasonable belief. 
This has been the cas e in England where the communication 
of one c onstable 's suspicion to another by radio has been 
held to be sufficient to create the necessary re~s onable 
suspicion in the arres tj_ng cons table~ 7 3 
It is suggested that this approach of the arres~ing co~-
stable actually forming his own suspicion and acting as 
the principal , as a result of another constable's c o~mun-
ication of his suspicions, is more approprjatc than the 
perceptlon of him as acting as the initial suspectjng 
constable 1 s agent . This is in accordance with the 
established distinction ~etween ' suspicion ' and ' belief 1 • 
It see~s doubtful that such a communication could create 
a reas onable belief on the arresting constabJe ' s 
~. ,..., /L 
j-Jcl. L , 0 
To see the arresting constable as an agent se0~s ~o tA a 
confusion of concepts the law could well de without . 
There are , no doubt , numerous other factors ab!e to cr8ate 
a suspicion , some general, some appropriate onl~ tc 
specif:.c offences . To create a list as h8.3 been 
normally entails generality and creates unnecessa~y :om-
plexity for ~he constable. It would see~ best to leave 
the matter to the courts, who will be bes~ ~ble to judge 
the r easonableness of the constables suspicj_o11 jn the 
myriad of situations that could arise . 
Clearly it is undesirable to attempt to decide in advance 
on questions of fact . 
That a constable must only 'suspect' that the arrested 
person committed the offenc e , and not ' believe ' allows 
for the operation of multiple arrests , for an offence 
which only one person could have committed . 
i.. 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
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Such was the case in Hussein76 where no signific ance was 
attached to the fact that two men were arrested on the 
grounds that they were both r easonably suspected for a 
crime that only one could have committed. Clearly then 
it is not the impossibility of whether all those arrested 
could have c ommitted the crime known to have only one 
culprit that is important , but rather whether all those 
arrested were reasonably suspected. Although the greater 
t he number arrested, if by the same constabl~ or detail 
awar8 of the other arrest, would tend to reduce the 
likelihood that th e courts would hold there was reasonable 
suspicion for all the arrests . 
A question frequen~ly raised in relation to qualified 
arrest powers , such as se c tion 315(2)(b)s that apply to 
a wide variety of offences is ' does the standard of 
reasonableness va~y according to the offence arrested for?' 
As would be expected there arA three divergj_ng attitudes. 
First, the courts should re~uire a higher degree of 
reas onableness for serious offences ; second, the courts 
will require a lesser degree of r easonableness for serious 
offences; third , the standard does not vary with regard 
to the offence . 
The first view has the ir.ipcrtanc e of the i:idi·, id ual as t.,e 
courts priority~ The cour~s are seen as attempti~g :o 
ensure th at individuals are not arrested, subsequently 
processed and stig~atised in a fashion reserved for these 
who ' deserve it' , unless there is good reason . Thus there 
would be a scrupulous consideration of grounds for any 
susoicion that resulted in an arrest for serious offences . 
The S8cond view stresses the wider public interest77 , and 
would see the cour:s as taking a lenient position in 
considering the reasonacleness of any suspicion of serious 
offences. This is to assist the police in the prevention 
of further crime and des~ruction of evidence. It is this 
vi ew t~at has found favour in American78 and English79 
courts . 
I 
I 
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The third view is of course the happy medium , which sees 
the court as being objective in its construing of reason-
a b 1 e n e s s regard J e s s o f t he o f fen c e • 
No bias toward eicher of the first two attitudes would 
appear clearly dominant in New Zealand courts. However, 
much the judiciary is aware of the diffj_culties of the 
Police task, and the ever-increasing crirne problem, they 
are equally awar e of the desirability of limiting state 
impositions on individuals . Thus possibly an overall 
analysis of the courts deciaion would indicate the third 
view is prevalent , though of course a single case out of 
that context could be an exception . 
I 
I 
I 
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C I~r8ach of thP Pea~ 
Sectj_an 315(2)(a) provides for an arrest of any person 
'found disturbing the public peace 1 while section 315(2)(b) 
provides for the arrest of those whom there is ' good 
cause to suspect of hav·i_ng comr1itted a breach of the peace '. 
t . 1 t- 80 Arr 3sts for eithe r two reaso na was un 1 recen ly , a n 
use of th e Police powers little known , and less obscure 
used •8 1 p . . rin:a facic these two concepts would apr..,ear to 
belong in the c o~nany of the of f ences dealing with public 
order - u~lawf• 1 asse~bly and riotin~ 1 sectio~s 86 and 8·7 
of the Cri~cs Act . 
just o :1 e o f de r-r e e , Lt is qJ 3 o : hat U-1 er '2 are r o of f e:::. c 0 s 
of ' distur\.-i::g :he ublic -peace ' O!' 1 br·~-:1s:: 0f :ne ~Je3.ce '. 
allo~ :he Police to -a~e lawf11 ar~es:s of ~;1:i?idu~ls who 
,.~.'i..3: . 
f 1" ' t t .J • • Ad °' 2 . . 1 t · o c..e oe er ..iefinitions . ams ; ""' in a com!n a ion of 
ratios contends that ' breach of :~c peace ' includes; 
"actual aG'3ault ar .:ic-·::ti~:c;, a.p"Y)ar~ntly eith--.r ::.n a 
public Place ~r on oriva c pr0~ises ••• it ~ay in 
this context ~x end to the co~~issio:1 o! so~e wrong-
ful act cnusi:r. public ala.:-c. a:1~ ,:i)<:cit8rr.cnt ••• use 
of insulti ~ oi abusive lai~uu- 0 if ttq act 
complainer! of.:._,.... one \'Ihich tends to attr,ct a crowd 
ar.d interfere wi-:h public convenience" . 
Of note is the Scot 0 defini ion nf b~e'lcr. 1Jf tl1 _ neace , 
w!-dc h is an offence , as "'ta ted by Lord LT us tice "c Donald . 83 
[ 
[ 
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"E'reach of the peace consists of such acts as will 
reas onably produce alarm in the minds of citizens , 
not neceGsarily alar~ in the sense of personal fear , 
but such alarm as causes them to believe ttat what 
is being done cauGes or will cause real diLturbance 
to the community'' . 
A "lore r ecent definition is that 1 rO'!ided in P . v. Howe1184 
"whenever harm actually oc,:urs , or is likely to occur , 
t o a person , or in his pr esence to his prop0rty, or 
when a person is in fear of bei~e har~ed thr0u~h an 
assau~- ~: r iot , unlawfu_._ a.'.3sc. bly or any other 
distu1'.'bA.nce ". 
These thr ee de fj_ni tions are with spec ifj_c re ferens e to 
' breach of t~e peace' , as such a auostion exists as to 
their application to !disturbing thn public peacP 1 • 
Despite the clear le~isla~ive ~rdica~ion of the d::ffere~ce 
in thG concepts , it is difficult to perceive what the 
dist::.ncti~n is ~o be, un2.~s:-; ~t i::i enc of de, .. ree, for 
w hi c h there is no e v ; de ::: r:: c • : r or ·,•1 o u 2- d t h s :r s :::; e e !"': to :: e 
::.ndPPd , t":.e 
arljectiv~ ' public ' to ' peac~ ' al-o doe3 ~at s~e~ ~o ha~e 
a~y pr3cti al ~iG~ificanc: . 
Therefor8 , for all intents and purposes ther~ would see~ 
co-:cet::t3 
;cac2' . 
pr2cedur.:1l use , ' disturbin5 ' ·1!:en L)Ur:d occurrint, and 
' br~ach ' having occurred . But this has been co~plicated 
by judicial i~teroretation of ~½8 ~atur2 of a breacn . 
It would arr~ar th;: o~ce a hr 3 ac1 h&s occurred it is 
repeated, rath~r t~an conti~ue . , consequently res lting 
i~ arrert~ for ' trPnch ' rat~er tban 'jist rba~ce ' even 
t~rUGh th9 a.t pe~ceiv~d to be a bre~ch was still occurring 
at the ti~:e of .c1rr-=>st. ~fi,, 'fonour Judc;e '1:aylor ' s decj_sio:!1 
. ..... • 1 ~ i l- , '86. 1.n ·P1., v -,.~. '"":'"'"''·- ,""' 0 r:-,2. 1....., ~n f?Xa'71~··le of this :_Jh0no;.1er.on , 
11
\''P ar: l:)f ~ on2,'.' 'N1.:r. a nov:er to arre.::::t after a nast 
or ~r~2ent b~~c;ch of ~~ ~e~cc hus occurred ••• the 
~>ri:::cs Act • • • i.'.3 spec i :ic in grant i~-8 .9o·Ners of arre"' t 
] 
] 
] 
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(continued) only in response t o br0a ,.,1e:; which ~.ave actualy occurred or are presently occurring11 . 
I f this i s indeed the case, the~ arrests for 'disturbing 
the public peace' would see~ to have been abroeated by 
judicial intcrrretation of t:!,e 1iow<?r to arrest :or a 
'breach of the peace'. 
Thus it would ap9car that th8 major distinction between 
the two concept~ their use no longer exists, and the 
Police new have the '30ft' option o~~n to tncn OL o~ly 
needing r0a~onab~A suspicion of t~e c~~cu~sta~c-s t~at 
would ~nd:cat9 a dis~u~ba~ce/~r~acn, rath3r ta~ actua:ly 
havir[ to 'fi~d1 it occ~rr·nc. 
EO"'iC'i er, 
; . ·~· .. .,. .. .,. --~ -
. 
, .J 
-r· 
:-.-.:; :/ 
.l : 
situaticns where they r0asor:acly al.',icinacP tLa~ 0 
OCC'Llr. T +-~ l, 
j 1:·:olved 
OCC1 ~, 
C a.1 ~it: 
desist with the ac~ivity. 
-, '":a, ,.: .. + 11' _ 1_.. •• ._., l 'v I 
be a rrested and char~ed with obb+-r· 
acting in the execut~on of Qr; duty;-·; 
ln each ca~e it is nec-ssary th~t j 
~ C: J. ~ 1,..1 .; (_-\-., I : - ,-. 0 • ., ._ .., .,., v_ .,_),. - J , 
• •, -. .-T' .-. -. I .. "~· ,.,.,~\.. I 
be decided o. the 
fac~s whethar the cons able had ~oaconable ~rourds for 
S'LT-=:cL.nr; th.at a dist l:'."'.'.l:,c"'/crer1.c~ had, or ·;oulrl have', 
o c ~~ 1J r r ·0 d . lf it ha not occurr8d, then the 2nticipation 
r1.'J.J to b2 t!:at thPre wa-=- :i. 'real' r:ot 
. ' :J:) of ~~  occurr2rcc. / 
'r~motc' ooesibilitv , v 
] 
l 
l 
] 
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There are three !'lai::-i j_:nplication3 arising from th e findings 
on these asnects of Lhe power to arrest . 
First , that unle ss the irrdividual arrestee! for a disturbance/ 
breach is subsequently charged with an offence , they will 
not be brcu 0 ht before a court . Thus the arr estee does not , 
except by civil action , have the opportunity to have the 
lawfulne ss of their arrest determined by a court , as the~ 
would havs if the? plead,3d not guilty to a criminal charge . 
Civil actio~~ are co~~licated , usua~ly of an extended nature , 
and as such , ~reoue. t!y exrensiv~ . 
nrnc2edinf3 f0r ~rJ~-~'..l~ Drr0st i= ar inade~unte chec:~ o~ 
the Police use o. :h ~ .-::;e D0':,0rc; 0: ,1:r:-ns: . 
;::}'\,....; ~;... .... 
~ ~1, ....;._ .,_) V 0 
of 
of:encP , section 316(5) of t~e Sr!~es Act does not req~irP 
these arreste :0r a dist'..lr!)ar.ce/'rrea h , to be brought 
' as 0 00n a~ ~ossi~le ' cefore a court . 
This quP~~~0~ re~ains unans~er 0 d de~pite the fact that it 
i.._, 
as 
acc~nt~rt _aw th3~ a~ ~rrost ro~aJn3 
u1 cont~~ued resLrJ:~: ~~ ·ustifiect : 
so lo~r; 
sto tut or:/ or j ud ic i a: , as to ·.·.:hat is 
There i3 no expre0sion , 
jus.ificd detention in 
• -1-
l l, ;•rould S'?c.:i unlikely tr; at tr.c 
Foli e woulc' ·:, ·_._,::,: to dc::ai.'1 ~o·~cone fer a period sufficiently 
extended to c2..U~') a ·.vri · to be L.:,...3UE?d . 
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Of course civil proceedings could be undertaken to discover 
whether the detention was u~justified er not , but to 
discover ones substantive rights by court decision , subse-
quent to the event when there is no present standard is 
unacceptable both to the individual , and the Police . 
r 
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D. Motive for Arrest . 
There has been a recent and novel development in the law 
relating to English police procedural powers , which wi~l 
have severe implications for any constable wishing to make 
a n a rrest . As the premise for such a development exists 
in New Zealand , the possibility of a similar approach being 
adopted by our courts warrants a consideration of the 
decision Jn ~ate - Mohammed v . Duke . 92 
'I'he question for the House of Lords arose from a suit 
of false imprisonment against the chief c onstable , he 
being vicariously liable for the actions of his constables . 
The action arose out of a constable arresting Holgate , 
the appellant , on suspicion of burglary . The court at 
first instance held that the arresting constable had had 
reasonaole grounds for forming the necessary suspicion but 
that the sole purpose for which the arrest was made was to 
subject Holgate to stress and pressure, so that sie ~ight 
confess more r eadily . This moti'le the Judge h~:d to be 
'j_mproper' and thus the cons taol e ' s exercise of t :rn ro·1;e~ 
to arrest was unlawful . 
The Court of Appea2 ai_owed an ap~eal by the ~hief c ons ta~l e 
·Jr. t he grounds thar the oo::j_ve we..s J.3.·;.rfi.11. 
T~ the ~ouse, Lo rd ~ - - .';3 .. 01p~ocK · confir~ea the decisj.on of 
th e Cour t of Appeal-but the reason ing for reachine ~he 
decision was somewhat more expansive . 
The powe r of arrest in issue , section 2(4) of the Criminal 
Law Act 196i is very similar to our section 315(2)(b), 
Where a constable , with r easonable cause, suspects 
that an arrestable offence has been committed , he 
may arrest without warrant anyone whom he , with 
reasonable cause, suspects to be guilty of the offence . 
] 
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Prior to Holgate - ~ohammed , a lawful arrest would have 
been made if jt was held the arresting constable did have 
reaso nable canse to suspect an arrestable offence had 
occurred, and the person arrested had committed it. 
However, Lord Diplock saw that fi nding as only one of t he 
conditions necessary in creating a lawful arrest 94 , 
"Section 2(4) of the 1967 Act makes it a condition 
precedent to a constable having any power lawfully 
to arrest a person without warrant that he should 
have reasonable cause to suspect that person to be 
guilty of the arrestable offence in which the 
arrest is being made ." 
Tte other condition identified as being necessary for a 
lawful exercise of the power arose out of the executive 
discretion (conferred by the wording of the sub- section 
- 'may arrest ' ) , whether to arrest or not . This recog-
nition of a discretion is not new, and had been stated 
by the Privy Council in ?.ussein . 95 
11 '1'0 give power to arrest on reasonable suspici.on 
does not mean that it is always or even ordinarily 
to be exercised . It means there is an execut~ve 
discretion . In the exercise of it many factors 1ave 
to be considered besides the strength of the case ••• 
There is no serious danger in a large measure of 
executive discretion in the first instance because 
countries wher e common law principles prevail th~ 
discretion is subject indirectly to judicial cont,rol 11 • 
What was novel was that the discretion, perceived as 
executive rather than judicial , was Lord Diplock claimed, 
able to be reviewed by a court, to decide whether or not 
,t had been ' lawfully ' exercised . 
Therefore for the exercise of the arrest power section 2(4) 
to be lawful (in accordance with its power) , the arresting 
constable must meet the two conditions arising from it • 
First , they must have reasonable cause to suspect an 
arrestable offence had occurred , and the person arrested 
had committed it , and second , the motive for arresting 
has to be lawful . 
l 
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It is incorrect to see this second condition as being 
a co mmon law fact or separ&te from the arrest power itself. 
Lord Diplock clearly states it arises from the power 
and is essenti.a.l for a lawful exercise of it. 
The lawfulness of t he exercise of discretion must be 
considered on the basis of me principles of administrative 
law which apply to public officers. These principles 
have been enunciated by the Master of the Rolls , Lord 
Greene, in the celebrated case of Associat ed Provincial 
Picture House v. Wednes8ury Cornoration . 96 
~ 
"The Court is entitled to investigate the actions 
of the local authority with a vi ew to seeing whether 
they had taken into account matters which they ought 
not to take into account, or converseJy , have refused 
to take into acc ount or neglected to taKe into account . 
Once that question is answered in favour of the local 
authority it may still be possible to say that although 
the local authority have kept within the four corners 
of the matters wnicn they ought to consider, they have 
none the less come to a conclusion so unreasonable 
that no authority could ever come tc it. In sucn a 
case again I think the court can inter :ere" . 
Thus in ,H.Q_lgate - ~1 ohamr.1.e_g there were three questioris to 
be answered: first, did the constable act in good faith? ; 
second , did the constable consider or not consider matters 
a reasonable constable should or shoul n't have? ; thiru, 
even i - a.i l appro;,rE:,., :natters were cons id E-:::· C?d or discarded 
was the concl~sion one a reaso~able constab:e couid have 
r eached 9 
There had already been a finding of fact that the constable 
had acted in good faith. A belief that the only evic.ence 
likely to prove Holgate ' s guilt would be a conf~ssion, and 
that such a confession would be more likely to arise from 
arrest and subsequent questioning , were, the House decided , 
proper considerations f or the constable ~o take into account . 
The ultimate dGcision to arrest was also reasonable. There-
fore the arrest was lawful and the suit failed. 
I 
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Such a matter was deemed relevant for consideration because 
what could justify an arrest on suspicion need not be 
admissible evidence nor sufficient for a conviction. Thus 
arrest: for the purpose of r esolving the suspicion, or 
obtaining admissible evidence was a lawful cons ideration 
for the constable. 
A judicial review of th e motive for an arrest , in order 
t o consider th e lawfulness of it (other than this House 
of Lords decision) has no Commonwealth authority , nor 
were any American cases referred toa Ne ver before has it 
been held or even adverted to that the power to arrest 
was c ontingent on the :noti·1e of the arresli:"!g constable . 
Arr est is a summary law enforcement procedure and alien 
to decisions taken by an administrator or tribunal , whose 
statutory power may well incorporate gu1del:nes as to its 
use and thus be amenable to the Lord Sr2e ~e principles . 
Unt ~l Holgate the courts ha·: li~itod :~ 0 ir ~on t ro] over 
arrest to whetjer tte a~~ested person was 'f cur.d sommitting ' 
an offence ar tner e had been 'reaso~able ground~ for 
s~spectin[ ' they had, depending on fue power arrested undere 
But now the courts in an atte~;t to further bala~ce the 
twin desires of individual freedom and crime control , have 
assumed the previously un.oticed rol e of fettering Police 
discretion. 
Csrtainly such a role had been accepted in ~elation to 
reviewing the exercise of discretion in policy ~atters , 
as observed by Lord Dennj_ng '.'-LR ., in B.i. v . "etrQJ2oli_tan 
Police Commission , ex_ narte RJackburn , 97 
"There are some nolj_cv dee is ions with which I think 
the courts in a ~ase ~an , if necessary , interfere~ 
Suppose a chief constable were to issue a directive 
to his men that no person should be prosecuted for 
stealing any goods less .han £100 in value. I should 
have thought that the court could countermand it . He 
would be failing in his duty to enforce the law" 
But some Police discretions the Master of Rolls considered, 
were unable to be r eviewect.98 
r 
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"It is for the Commissioner of the Metropolis , or 
the chief constable as the case may be, to decide 
in any particular case whether enquiries should be 
p11rsued or whether an arrest should be made or a 
pr osecution brought". 
In any event, Plackburn was not considered by the House , 
or the Court of Appeal. 
The main basis for the House construing the discretion as 
reviewable was the arrest power ' s use of the word ' may :. 
lt is questionable wh e ther this was in fac t an indicator 
by the legislature that the motive of the arrest was £;. 
rel evant factor in consid ering its lawfulness . More 
likely , ' may ' was merely the means to grant an arrest 
power , subject to the conditions of ' reasonable suspicion ' 
or 'finds committing '. 
If a '.'Jew Zealand court were to follo·N '-:olgate - :o ha11':'"lQ., 
as indeed it coul , given that the basis for decision , 
the incorporat2.::rn of ' may arrest' on the arre,=-:: y,ower 
exists in sections 315(2)(a) and (b), tte i~~2diate issue 
arises - ' what are lawful motives for a~ arrest? 1 
This would involve a consideration of the current reas ons 
why Police constables make arrests . It has been suggested99 
that there are nine basic reas on s why an arrest, ::.~at : er 
than some other procedure! 00 is used by constables. 
(a) To e<lsure that the accused appears for trial:- while 
it is accepted that it is difficult in our modern, inter-
dependent society to 'l ose ' someone it is easier to keep 
total control over them than to have ta 'find' them later . 
(b) To enable ancilliary rights to be exercised by the 
Police against the suspect :- suer. as search of the person 
and property 101 , taking of photographs and fingerprints . 
(c) To enable the suspect to be identified: - when a 
summons can 't he served as the Police are unsure of the 
suspects identity . 
I 1 
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(d) To enable the Police to detain for questioning :-
in relation to the offence arrested for, or possibly , 
some other suspected of . 
(e) To allow the Police to prepare their case without 
hindrance from the accused :- a suspect may destroy or 
suppress evidence , intimidate witnesses or conspire to 
do such activities . 
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(f) To haraGs or punish the accused and intimidate others . 
(g) To prevent a suspect from undertaking further 
crimi~al activity . 
(h) To protect the accused :- from community outrage of 
a physical nature or from the accused's own actions through 
re morse . 
( . ) \ l To mark the serious nature of the offence alleged 
to have been com~itted . 
Some of these reasons may be lawful motives for arrest, 
others not . But formal indicators as to what is reasonable 
dr8 difficult to find$ 
~'hE: :eisislature r.as not expres::.,l,· prcvide'.i for anv, but 
so~9 arise by implication . ection 19 CL tle Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 provides that a war~act for arrest 
should be issued if it is ~ecessary to corn el attendance 
at court , or to emphasise the severity of the offence . 
((a) and (i) above . ) 
Nor have the courts provided much in the way of indicators. 
Ji_g_lga te - (lo hammed approved arrest for questioning ( ( d) 
. ) d J . 1 02 . d d aoave , an , 1sse1n provi e , 
11 The possibility of escape, t.he prevention of 
further crimes and the cbstru8tion of police 
enquiries are examiles of those factors with which 
all judges who have had to grant or refuse bail are 
familiar 11 • 
(That i.s (a) , (g) and (e) above . ) 
r 
r 
r 
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The Police al s o appear lacking in the pr ovision of suitable 
motives for arrest. In their boo k of general instruction, 
th ere is a rec ogri.i tion that the pow er to ar r est II is at all 
times to be exerc:i.s ed with discr e tion" .. 103 Expans ion on 
this general conside ration incl udes having ngcod and 
sufficient reason s " 104 for arresting childr en a nd young 
persons, a nd res pectabl e cit i z e ns who hav e c ommit t ed minor 
offences 105 , wh o can be br ought be f or e t he c ourt on summons. 
The inferenc e from these 's pars e ' ins tructions would seem 
to be that for the P olice, arres t i s t he no r mal me th od 
of initiating a crimi nal pro~ecut:i.on . 
I t would t he r efor e appear t hat if t he c curt s in this 
c ountr y a r e pr epar ed t o take t he bold step o f fo ll ow i ng 
t he Hol~ate - :1oham~ 0 d pr ecedent , and fur ther ' fet t e r ing ' 
Police discretio n, fo r ~al indicators as t o ' lawful ' 
mot i v es wi ll be r eq1ir ed . Tt is unaccepta~le chat a 
constable shouLi have a n arrest dt. eried ur:J_aw ful b-<:c au :::,e 
a c ourt decides there was an unlawful mcti~~ involved in 
the a r res~ , when t~e only cer~ai~ty as to wha: i3 law~ul 
or not has a r isGn f r om tha~ de c ision ~ 
l t would the r efor e be appropriate , for pu r pcses of cer~~i~ty, 
and J.egi.tirnel.cy , l r.at ttc la·1r!'t.:.l :-:10-.:::..v r~s :c . .1e ::ro:n t!'ie 
legislatJre . Cou~t i~pose ~otives a~e like:y :o be sc~e-
what al.'....en :"r0 r:1 the 'Hor~i:,g ~r!'1i.r 0 nn.ent, o.: t:·1e Jol:;_ --s, 
ar:::i of cou:-se dcrr,;ed f~0':1 :-.i·-:ds::;ht Fo1:;..c2 ' .. otiv8s 
are likely ta be too general and recard 0 d by the pu:lic 
(and courts ? ) with s uspic ion and cynicism~ 
I 
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E. ~atters of Jus tification or ~xcus_g . 
Section 315(2)(a) and (b) were considered independently 
of c ertain 'justifying' provisions in Part III of the Act, 
primarily for ease of analysis and to ensure there is no 
confusion between them and 'powers'. 
Section-3.J.. 
Every constable is justified in arresting any person 
with out warrant in accordance with provisions of 
section 315 of this Act or in acc ordance with any 
other enactment conferring on him a power to so 
arrest . 
By ' justifying ' acyarrest in accordance with section 315 
is meant that a constabl e who so arrests is 'not guiJty 
of an offence , and not liable to any civil proceeding'. 
T t 'i • I • th t . 7.. • r::.. ( -;_; )' ,' \ .o arres n accorctance wi. sec ior. _.,/;.,,~ a; 
arrested person must have been four.d by t .'.1A arr6s :,~.>:·; 
constable and must have committed the offe~c8 arres: ~c 
for. If these element:::: ar2 not present. in tr "'= arTess, the.'.1 
it was not lawful, and not in accordance with its po~sr , 
it cannot therefore be justiried under section 31. 
Henc e any charges resulting from such arr~st, whjch iecu~r~ 
it to be lawful can~ot oe pressed, and tte arres~~~ g 
constable may oe uilty of an ofr e ncet and liable fc~ civil 
proceedings . 
Similarly, to arrest in accordance with section 315(2)(b) 
requires the arresting constable to have good cause to 
suspect the arrested person had committ ed an offence . If 
that good cause d'id not exist then the a1-rest was not 
lawful and not in accordance with its power and therefo e 
not justified under section 31 . 
In addition, should the Hol.P-:a te - · foh~i,;·:;meg_ d0c is ion be 
applied j_n New Zealand for an arrest under either power 
to be in accordance with its provisions it would have to 
be for a lawful motive . 
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Consequen t ly it can be seen that section 31 will only justify 
a rrests under section 315(2)(a) and (b) if they are lawful . 
However , i t is implicit that a constable who acts lawfully 
cannot be liable to civil or criminal proceedings . There-
fo r e section 31 would appear unnecessary . 
Section .3.f;. . 
Where under any enactme~t any constable has power to 
arrest without warrant any person who has committed 
an offence , the ccnstable is justified in arresting 
without warrant any person whom he believes, on 
r easonable and probable grounds to have committed that 
offence, whether or not the offence has in fact been 
committed , and whether or not the arrested person 
committ ed it. 
This section provides a justification for constables who 
mistakenly 'believe' on ' reasonable and probable' grounds 
that an offence has occurred and the person they arrested 
. d106 , . has committed it. As has been state reasonaole and 
probabls 1 car. be :aken as ~c~e1y 'r eas onable ' . 
There is a qi;.e3t:'..n:1 as t0 the extent of th'= protec tio!l 
granted . Clearly a reaso~ahle but mista~en belief as to a 
state of facts ~s covered, buL rct it would appear as to the 
law . 
But to whic~ arrest fC~era : 1; any, does section 32 app:y 0 
A literal read:. nr; ~nc.2.cates ·~hat tr.e power to arrest th.gt 
section 32 appli ~s to is one of 'arresting any person wno 
"has committ ed " an offence' . The arrest power prima facie 
protected by section 32 is absolute, and phrasea in the 
past tense. Neither section 315(2)(a) or (b) are such 
powers . It would appear then that section 32 applies to 
enactments other than the Cri~es Act. 
But there are no absolute arrest powers phrased in the past 
tense . Thus it would appear that section 32 is without an 
area for application . 
However , the courts would be unlikely to accept such an 
interpretation , especially given the impetus of section 5(j) 
of the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 . l07 
-
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It requires that the provisions of Acts rec eive an inter-
pretation that will best ensure the attainment of the in-
tention of that provision . 
Clearly the intention of section 32 is to provide a 
justification for arrestors. But the question of which 
powers are to be justified, if they are not lawful, is 
raised . 
There are thr ee options: Section 32 applies to; all 
ar~est powers; only absolute powers; or only qualified 
powers. 
Ar gumen ts exist i~ favour of all options. Applying section 
32 t o all powers gives a large measure of previously absent 
protection to a constable who arrests under an absolute 
provision . If the contention that reasonable suspicior. as 
to the commission of an offence is contained in aual~fied 
b . 1 . . 1 08 . t· . -- .., 1 d powers y imp ication is correc~ hen section ;c a~ 3 
no thing to them. If that contention is inc orrect then 
section 32 actds a previously absent p r otection o these 
arresting under qualified powers, although the standard 
of r easona bl eness is the higher one of belie • 
Indeed if section 32 did apply to aualified powers then 
there would be a doubling up of the protection for those 
who made an ho~est but reasonable ~istake in arresting 
the wrong person . ~hat makes section 32:s application to 
qualified powers even more unlikely is that the diff~re~ces 
in the standard of reasonableness between 'believ e ' and 
' suspect 11 09 would result in it being easier to make a 
lawful arrest than a justified one . 
Thus it would appear that if section 32 were to apply 
to any arrest powers it would not be qualified ones , 
merely absolute . S uch a conten tion is strengthened by a 
realisation that there is no r easo n to d j_s t ir:guisn between 
a ' present tense' and a ' past tense' phrased absolute 
arrest power , in the granting of a justification. 
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Unlawful ~rrest . 
The law relating to arrest is specified so that u nacceptable 
breaches of the state~ authority over individuals can be 
c ontrolled , sanctioned and repetitions inhibitedo 
A distinction has been d r awn between 1 awful ' and ' jus t ified ' 
arrests . Usually the two concepts are muddled into one , 
especially where there is talk of a titizens power of 
A ' lawful ' arrest is one in accordance with the power granted. 
In the Crimes Act these powers exist only in section 315 
(2)(a) and (b) . If a lawful arrest is made, then it is 
possible that fail re to act precisely as told by tne 
constable could result in further charges other than the 
one arrested for being pressed . T~ese include : resisting 
a constable acting in the execution of duty (Section 23(a) 
of the Summary Offences Act; assaulting a constable i! 
the execution of duty (Section 10 of the Summary Gffenc ?s 
Act); and escaping frcrn lawfu: custody (Section 120( :)Cc~ 
of the Crimes Act) . 
Thus even if the original offence arrested for is not proven, 
and one or ~ore of the above three 0f~ences occu rss 2n lcng 
as the in~tial : rr·est was lawful ~he !urther c~arges can 
be p~essed . 
But if the init~al arrest was unlawful , the individual~ 
rights supercede those of the constables , so that the 
a r re2tee can ' reasonably' resist , even if that entails 
assa~lt and can lawfully ' escape' from custody . 
The unlqwfully arrested individ11al may wish the arrestor 
to be charged with a criminal offence - assault , or 
institute civil proceedings - false imprisonment . It is 
at this stage that the justification pr ovided by section 32 
may grau t some protection to the constable . Presumably 
t his protection was enacted to pr otect those c onstables 
who although acting unlawfully , did so in good faith and 
whose mistake was reasonable . 
l 
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As has been stated it is doubtful that section 32 applies 
to arrests made under section 315(2)(b) as it is easier 
for an arrest to be made lawful under it, than justified 
under section 32 . It seems likely that section 32 applies 
to , at least , section 315(2)(a) . As a result , although 
an arrest made under fuis absolute provision may not be 
lawful , if there was a reasonable belief t hat the arrested 
person had committed an offence and the offence arrested 
for had occurred~ civil or c riminal proceedings wo uld be 
blocked . 
However the recent decision of ~r Justice Sinclair in 
Andrew v . Police 110 indicates that he does not perceive 
such a distinction between ~owers' and 'justification '. 
"Section 32 of the Crimes Act 1961 alt,o gives uowers 
to a constable in relation to an arrest without 
warrant ••• whether the person arrested is subsequently 
convicted matters little so long as the person effect~ng 
the arrest has the belief based on reasonable grounds 
that an offence has occurred" (Emphasis added). 
Although this was only an obiter statement, severe 
implications arise out of a per-ception of sectlon 32 as 
a power to arrest . These are .-;_ncreased with a realj_satj_on 
that the case was dealing not with a suit of false arrest, 
but a prosecution resulting from the arrest, that r.eeded 
this arrest to he lawful. 111 
Such a statement could mean one of two things (or even 
both?) . First , that section 32 itself is an arrest power . 
Second , that the arrest provisions which section 32 applies 
to must have their ' power' read with that of section 32. 
Thus if as has been argued section 32 applies to section 
315(2)(a) it is no longer an absolute provision . A lawful 
arrest may still be made if the constable arresting makes 
a reasonable mistake as to the existence of an offence , 
and that the person arrested had committed it . 
A similar finding occurred in the Canadian decision E..._ v . 
Biron . 
112 
Biron had been arrested by a constable for 
' creating a disturbance by shouting ' under an absolute 
arrest power . He was then passed to another constable who 
passed him onto a third . 
] 
] 
] 
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At this stage Biron protested against his arrest , for which 
he was subsequently charged and convicted of ' resisting a 
c onstable in the execution of duty '. He was acquitted of 
t he ' disturbance' charge and appealed against his ' resistance' 
c onvi.c tion. 
The appeal was allowed by a majority of the Quebec Court 
of Appeal , which held that as Biron had not been found 
committing a criminal offence his arrest was illegal and 
he was entitled to reasonably resist it. The Crown ap~caled . 
On appeal the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court using 
Wiltshire v ~ Barrett , held that the absolute ar:r:e.c,t power 
Biron had been arrested under should have the qualification 
' apparently' read in , thereby making the arrest lawful 
and resistence t o it unlawful . 
But , and important for our purposes , the majority, in case 
it were mistaken as to the nature of the arrest pov~r, 
noted that ~e constable who was enforcing 3i~on's cus:Jcy 
at the ti:ne of the resistence was ' ju::::":.-J ::i. ed ' 1n so doi.ng~ 
This 'justified custody ' was held to mean that the constable 
had a lawful sanction to enforce Biron ' s custody and ~s 
such Biron was under lawful arrest o 
Chief Justice Laskin in dissent, expressed the exasperat~on 
he and subsequent comme1tators felt at such a decision. 11 3 
''I would find it astonishing that a provisio~ concerned 
with a constable's criminal or other responsioility, 
and which immunises him in specific circums tances in 
respect of an arrest that he has made. should become 
the vehicle for providing a basis upo~ which an accused 
may himself be convicted of resisting the arrest . To 
do that is to turn a protection provision, a shleld, 
for the constable~into a sword against an accused by 
treating the protection as an expansion of the power 
of arrest already expressl.1 grar ted " 
With respect to the majority in P.iI:Qll , and Mr Justice Sj_nclair, 
it is contended that this dissenting view of the Chief 
Justice gives the more appropriate interpretation of fue 
legislation . 
] 
] 
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There are other strong legislative indications t hat a 
perception of section 32 as a power is contrary to the 
i~tention of the legislature . If section 315(2)(a) was 
intended to have a qualified power it would have been 
expressed similan;to section 315(2)(b) e That it wasn ' t 
c learly indicates that it was meant to be an absolute 
power . Further , the phrasing of sec t ion 32 makes it 
clear t hat it was meant as a justification . Perception 
of it as a power makes the following nonsensical : 
Where under any enactment any constable has a 12.Q.WCI. 
to arrest without warrant any person who has com~itted 
an offence the constable is iustified ••• (Ernphas.Ls 
added) . 
Fi~ally the i~t?rpretation in section 2 of justified, 
i~dicates that it was for defensive. not off~1sive,purposes~ 
TLe legislature by providj_n6 a dis tine tlon between a 
Justi!ied arrest , and one that is lawful, h~ve atte~p~e~ 
to ensure that individuals who act cr1 their r j 6 n ts i[; 
re sis ting an unJ_awful arrest cannot be pe na1-i.38d . A.3 a. 
necessary corollary, it was essential that constaoles 
who make unlawfal arrests but act in good faith nna ~hose 
mistake to its lawfulness was reasonable, should also not 
be penalised. 
] 
] 
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IV ACTUALITY v. MYSTIQUE 
Having tentatively identified the actuality of the law of 
arrest, it now remains to consider how closely it matches 
its mystique. lts mystique being that perception of the 
law held by its adherents, fostered by the law itself and 
its agents .. 
This perception has as a fundamental premise that arrests 
are not to be arbitrary, but to occur within an established 
framework, 
''In the id2alogy of the liberal democratic state the 
role of the state over the individual is closely 
circumscribed by the notion of legality 11 11h 
The 'notion of legality' is seen as being emnodied in both 
the Common Law and statutory law. The trend in recent 
times, in an attempt to reduce the arbitraryness of the 
impositions of the states authorit.y, has been to locate 
the law wi thi:1 statutes. This has bee:1 done to -;;:-:sure 
that a 'base' point exists for the a1,in]icaticn cf a par:-
icular law, both modernising it and improving its clarity 
2nd specifity& The purpose for cuch a progres~i0n was to 
allow for a greater certainty in ~ny stacs-citize~ 
'I'he c 1 rrent laws two parts , sabstant:..ve and J).:'.'OSP.dl·~-:!, 
are accepted as t~e legislatures attempt ta 
c:)nflict.i:1g societal dcsirss for , :..nc:ii-:idual fr::. .. :d:. 'i a.:·,o 
s :ability of social order . De1Jeno.irie; oa tie bi£",·j of the 
state, the balance could be reached at any number of 
paints on the scale between such opposite goals~ 
VcBarnet ide~:ified six concepts that. we:a seen as essential 
in achiev2.ng t; ,e desired bal.:-~'lct~, and i!:1pJ. icit in the societal 
consens~s of legality. Certainly this was the perception 
for British society, and it 1.:: sugg2~ ted that they are 
appropriate for our purposes. 
Thus the laws ~ystique propounds that in the limiting of 
the state's impositions on the individual , the notion of 
legality present in statute law embodias the following 
concepts : 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
• ] 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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1. That arrest powers are cl early stated; 
That arrests are only made in relation to a specified 
offence; 
That incriminating evidence of the offence is needed 
before an arrest for it can be made; 
That the offences themselves are clearly defined; 
That an arrestee can resj_st an unlawful arrest.; ., 
6 . That all arrests are accountable • 
How well does the actuality of New Zealand law match itc 
mystique by the embodymen t of these six concepts ? 
First, that arrest powers are ~le&rly stated~ Certain1.y 
section 315(1) of the Crime~ Act a ssur es that there are 
only statutory arrest powers, but &s has been seen , due 
to the drafting i~consistencies, there is some confusion 
as to their Pxact c~nlent& 
"J "J..h J.." 7 .. ,-•'")' '\ 1 1 ., sec ., l '.) n ) , ::;, , (: 1, a , this confusicn arises :ram such 
queries as: wh5.t does '.:ir.d' mean?; is it ·,r1l:T a.').301..'Jte ?; 
who 'nlist find the off9nC.er ':; and vthen car1 J...zH: ~rrc·S\, t8 
mRd e '? 
Wi th section 31~(2)(b) t he confusion arises f~u~ q~e~L~uns 
as to: wh'?d1 1:>r 1:he ,1ualif j_cation refer2 , by implication, to 
m.i.sta3:es .qs :.o the ey"i_s cer:ce of an of:enc:'=' : ; v:.:-i: J:.n0r U1 
assumptj.o~ of a cJm~o~ ~t~~darc ~~ reasonaoieness i~ 
quallfic~ticn ~s cor~sc~ ? ; wheth3r the sig~i~ic~nce at~a:~cct 
to the -:i.i..::;r:i.::;c:+,io~ between 'belj_ef ' a!1d 'su.spic.ic·r1 1 is 
appropria~e ? ; whaL js suff~cient to create a susp!cJon ?; 
to what ext.8::t ·.vill :·easonable suspicion allow multiple 
arrests?; and wnother the standard of reasonableness v&rics 
according i;o ·:~to. s8·re:r"i ty of the offence ? 
There are further q~estions as to whecher the motives for 
an arrest are reviewable: and if so , what are lawfaJ 
motives . Nor is it cl ear : what the concepts of tlisturbance 
of the publi~ peace ' or 'breach of the peace' entai l; 
whether the drafting distinction between the two is 
sig~i ficant ?; and why~~~ concept of 'disturbance' seems 
to have been aorogated by the courts. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Such confusion is aggravated when apparently clear distinc -
tions between 'lawful ' and ' justified ' arrests are ignored . 
Indeed with the justification provisions it is unclear 
which arrest powers they refer to ; whether a reasonable 
mistake of law is cov ered ; and whether the existence of 
such provisions imply that lawful arrests a r e not in them-
selves protected from civil or cri~j_nal proceedings • 
The questiomraised above/are not so fanciful or obscure 
as to be only of interest to academics but are very real 
issues of contention affecting the cont e n~ of one of the 
central procedural powers of the criminal law . Certain 
indicati ons as to the possible answers of so~e of th ese 
ques tions have been provided ~n thls paper , but cle a r ly 
misgivings will still exist . 
Thus while arr est powers must be str~ctly adhered to, 
it is unclear exactly what entai:s a 'law ful ' or eveu a 
' justified ' arrest. The clarity and specifi:ity hoped 
for, and clai~ed by the mystia~e to ~xist , hae beco~e lost 
in a complex web of legal niceties, tha~ de l~t~le t o curb 
the states authority • 
Se c ond , that arrests are only ~ade in re!atian to a specified 
offe'.'lce . '.::'his concept is clertrly S-=V-;r 2c :·re:., the actuality 
of the _aw, by fue allowance of ar~es~s f~r 1 aistu~bing t~e 
public peace' and 'breach of the peace 1 , neither of w nic,: 
are :Jf.fences • 
If it is accepted that an arr est is a justifi ed detention 
of an individual a gainst their will, then there is the 
phenomenon of 'de facto arrests' altho ugh th ey hav e 
specifically not been termed as ' de jure' arrests by the 
legislature . These also are remov ed from the mystique 
in that they are not for a spe~ified offence, but for a 
specified purpose • 
Examples o f these de facto arrest powers includ~ the power 
to stop and search any person reasonabJ.y believed by any 
constable to be in possession of offensive weapons or 
disaoli~g substanc es - section 202B of th& Crimes Act ; 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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the power to detain and search any person r easonably 
believed by any constable t o have stole n or unlawf ully 
obtained property in their possession - sec tion 227A of 
the Crimes Act; the power to require the user of a motor 
vehicle to stop and give their name and address on demand 
of a ny constable - section 66 of the Transport Ac t 1962 ; 
the power to dP.tain a driver reasonably suspected of having 
c onsumed dr ink for t he administering of a breath test -
section 58A of the Transport Act 1962 ; t he power to deta~n 
a person found intoxicated j_n a public place - section 37 A 
of the Ale oholism and Dr:1g Add5ction Act 1966; and the 
power to detain and search a person reasonably believed 
to possess controlled drugs - section 8 of the ~isuse 
of Drugs Act 1975. 
Such powers , although not classified as arrests , would 
seem to manifest exter:-ial indicators of an ar:test, and 
conseque~tly as they are not for an of~ence, altho1gn cnargaE 
could result out of their use, are a clear breac11 ... )f ::. !~e 
mystique • 
However, there are clear policy reasons for the existc~ce 
of each power, which are limited in their application. 
For example, with all except ' intoxication ' the 'arrest' 
is only _er the period of the search or ques~ionirf~ 
In such cases, the options of either altering tne n0we~s 
so that they are de jure arrests for offences, or their 
total abolition, are both undesirable . Thus ele~ents of 
the actuaJity that do not meet the mystique are in some 
cases appropriate , and in others such as 1disturbance1 or· 
I I 
breach are not .. 
Third , that incriminating evidence of the offence is needed 
before an arrest for it can be made . The absolute power 
to arrest , section 315(2)(a) would seem to embody this 
aspect of mys~ique . For , to ' find' an offenc e being 
committed would necessitate incriminating ev idence to be 
apparer.t . 
] 
] 
] 
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However as section 315( 2 )(b) allows a n arrest to be made 
on reasonable suspicion , there is no requirement that the 
suspicion has to be created by incriminating evidence . 
The necessary suspicion could arise from inadmissible 
ev idence , and the ar r est used to provide admissitle 
( incriminating) e v idence of the offence . 
Despite this apparP-nt distancing of the law f rom its 
mystique , the necessity for arrest.ors using qualified 
powers, such as section 315(2)(b) to act on evidence not 
necessarily incriminating may reauire the mystique to be 
alte r ed rather than the law . 
Fourth , that offences themselves be clearly defined. 
Although this concept is beyond that of mere arrest, it 
is appropriate to note that strict p~ocedural requirements 
do little to restrict arbitrary arrest , if the subs1,ar.tive 
law they enforce is vague . 
Certain of the ~ore common concepts/offences, sucn as 
breach of the peace , resisting arrest or obstruc~ion, rely 
fundamentally on the Commcn Law and Police definitions. 
Consequently what will constitute the necessary act is less 
than clear and subject. to value judgments "Khe:re tbe 
authority view has da~inance . 
Other offences may have some doubts as to aspects cf tneir 
control , that is unavoidable . But thic failure in law 
to mat.eh its mystique to the extent it does in ' margina.l 1 
offences is undesirable and inappropr iate . 
Fifth , unless an arrest is lawful the arrestee need not 
submit to it . This notion of legality has often found 
judicial expression , in terms such as those of Lord 3imonds , 11 ~ 
11 
••• it is the corollary of the right of every citizen 
to be free f r om ar r est , that he should be entitled to 
resist. arrest unless that a r rest i s lawful". 
] 
J 
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The difficulty in exercising such a right exists initially 
in the vagueness of certain of the offences, wher e the 
arrestee may believe he has not committed an offence, thus 
perceiving any arrest as being unlawfule Such an action 
is aggravated by the distinction between absolute and 
qualifi ed arrest powers. 
An individual who resists an arrest, performed under 
section 315(2)(a) because they are sure they have not 
been found committing an offence, which is later borne 
out , will have been entitled to resist because the arrest 
would have be en unlawful . However, it appears that if 
the constable had made an honest and reas onable mis ta~e 
as to the act oelieved to have beeYJ. c ov;;:r1itted by the 
arrestee , sec tion 32 would justify the arrest. Hence no 
civil or criminal proceedings could oe instigated against 
the constable . iJo r could chare;es of resis:ir:g be broughi: 
agai~st the arrestee . 
But if fue same constable with the lesser standa~d of proof 
of the offence, only a suspicion , had arrested u~c;~ 
section 315(2)(b), the arrest wou:d have been l~Hf~~ s~d 
~ny resistenc e could have lead to further char 6 es . 
Thus whether P" individual in~ocent o~ ar:y cf ence f3r:d 
disturbance or ~reach) lawfu:ly resists an arre~t or not, 
derer-.c;:; o:: the an'est power used by the cor.stao.:..1; . 
?ven if the resisting was initially unlawfu,, it is ati:l 
possible that a charge o f common assault could arise . 116 
This would be the r esul t of an individual who forcibly 
exercises their right to be free from unlawful arrest. 
This is because section 39 of the Crimes Act authorises a 
constable to use such force as may be necessary to overcome 
any force US8d in resisting arrest. 
Naturally then, any resistence to an ultimately unlawful 
arrestWJuld be countered by the constable, which could 
result in greater resistence, until assault would seem to 
be the very least of tne charges able to be brought. 
LA\•/ L!Ci\).ir.' 
\...,Cm~\ 0:J!VERS!Tt. CF. \.~'CU.:!.~:-... ,. 
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If the resistence was initially reasonable yet repeatedly 
countered by the arresting constable, it is unclear at 
what stage this escalation of violence woull be deemed to 
have ceased being reasonable. 
Thus it would appear that an individual ~ing arrested and 
unab}e to make the same post hoe analysis of the reason-
ableness of a constabl~s suspicion/belief in making a 
lawful/justified arrest, resists at their own peril. This 
would appear unsatisfactory as evidence of offences other 
than the one arrested for, that turn up as a result of 
an unlawful arrest, is admissible . Indeed it appears a 
no-win situation for the arrestee as resisting an arrest -
exercising what is perceived as ones civil rights can be 
seen as indication of guilt 117 and not resisting can be 
seen as acquiescence in a 'fair cop' • 
The dissatisfaction with this aspect of the mystique does 
not end here • 
Constables acting lawfully (or even unlawfully but just-
:i.fiably) should not have to expect to suffer resistence/ 
assault from individuals who believe mistakenly or 
correctly that they are acting in lawful defence of their 
rights • 
Thus while this aspect of the mystique doe· have conie basis 
it has a very limited application, which is difficult tG 
ascertain at the moment of its occurrence. As such it has 
undesirable connotations for bot~ indivi.duals who mista ~e nly 
attempt to act on the mystique, and constables who must 
suffer the consequences of such mistakes . 
Sixth , that all arrests are accountable. This aspect of 
the mystique is correct, if somewhat misleading . Arrests 
are only accountable if challenged . That such a challenge 
is unusual is not surprising once it is realised that to 
make such a claim in the case dealing with the offence 
arrested for is generally perceived as unnecessari}y 
aggravating the court, (Compounding this of course is that 
most defendents plead guilty) . 
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Further that any civil claim is usually complicated, of 
a drawn out nature and as such, frequently costly. 
Indeed as has bee n noted , vague substantive laws and wide 
procedural powers make it v ery difficult to make an effective 
c heck on their use. This of course assumes that the courts 
are totally objective in their appr oac h . However , it would 
seem that the c ourts have an inherent reflex to support 
the police, and only sanction tho se actions grossly ultra 
vires 118 • A popular expression of this intention ts given 
by Lord Br idge , 119 
11 Makir..g an arrest can nev er be an agreeable task and 
may often be very disagreeable; how ~uch ~ore so if 
the law gives P.O assurance of protection!' • 
Therefore it would appear that a gap between the actuality 
of the law and its my .stique does exist in :rew Zealand . 
Certain asnects of this gap are understandao:e, possibly 
even desirable, others are not . 
Ttat this gap exists and has been found t~r0ush a legis -
lative study of the law , r ather than an int e ractionist 
approach indicates that the deviation is institutionalised . 
Thus the recurring examples of contradictions b8t~een 
the myst ique and practice of law ar e not merely the result 
of the activities of the ' bit' player~ within the syst~me 
Certainly the police nay have lobbied for certain c f the 
powers identified in this :paper , but tne fact re:nalr.s 
that each and every aspect was granted by Parliament . Or 
if not granted , and merely the result of judicial in~er-
pretation , then not amended . 
This finding of an institutionalised deviation prompts 
these questions raised by ~c Barnet: why does such a 
deviation occur? ; how is it managed and legitimised , and 
by whom?; and why does it vary? 
" Finding that the law does not live up to its rhetoric 
then, is not just the end of a piece of indignant 
research but the beginning of a new series of questions" 
120 
Such questions cannot be answered in this paper . What can 
be done is to suggest some reforms to limit the gap between 
the laws myst ique and actuality . 
] 
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V CONCLUSIOH A"l'D REFORM . 
Therefore as has been seen the law of arrest without 
warran t does not appear to match the mys t ique t ha t 
56 
emanates f rom lt . The questions arising from a r ecognition 
of this institutionalised deviation will not be considered 
in this paper , merely acknowledged . Rather , this paper 
will conclude with certain reforms that , it is suggested , 
will go some way to narrowing the gap between the law ' s 
actuality and mystique . 
That there is not a general outcry against the existence 
of this gap is an ins fficied rcascn for ignoring its 
existence . ~ne po~ential exists in the law , as at 
present , :or an arbitrary use of arrest powers . That 
this is an infrequent occurence is more the result of 
the good intentions of the agerts of me law, rather than 
th l . . l f A . b d 121 . . t . - d _ e _aw itse • .s rias een note sucn inten ions wou.1 
res lt pr~~arily fr o~ the Police, and ~o some exte~t 
courts, bei~[ ttemselves iEbued with t~e mystiqu 0 • 
+-' ~:: e 
However, reli&nce on such fortuit ots sentime~ts in the 
operation of the law is unsatisfactory . That tne law 
does not embody its mystiqu~ ~hich in some rcs;ects is 
desirao2.~, Leans that both the Police 1.nd indiviciuals 
certainty in their iealings wi~h one a~o:her. 
" ' 1.ac .. -<. 
It could of course bear ued that it would be eaoier ta 
re - orientate the mystique to match the law . That , it is 
contended , is unacceptable given the desirable nature of 
certain aspects of the mystique , and the many undesirable 
aspects of the present law . Nor would it increase the 
certainty of the laws operation . 
Thus the folJowln~ reforms will go further than merely 
creating grammatical consistency within the law, to a 
real attempt to improve the confidence of both parties in 
any Polic e - ind i.v id ua.l interaction . 
I 
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Consequently, to provide clear and specific laws of arrest, 
and to incorporate those el emen ts of the mystique that are 
desirable, the following reforms are suggested . 
It is unrealistic to expect constables to arrest only 
those guilty of an offence, ne ga ting any fallibility in 
deciding, the existence of an offence or the identity of 
its perpetrator . The ascribing of an impossible standard, 
and the penalising of those who fail to mee t it, is 
unlikely to provide for the efficient maintenance of 
s ocial order . 
Therefore the quali ficati on of 'reasonable suspicion ' on 
a constable ' s part as to the commission of an offence , 
and who committed it , should be maintained but extended 
to cover al! arrest situations . As a result there should 
no longer oe ar.y 'absolute ' arrest powers , nor any justi-
fic a tj_on ,rov ls lens . 
Thus an arrsst would either be lawful or not . If it wasn't 
the!l tl1e arre:::;tor could be subject to criminal and/0r 
civi l proceedings . 
However there should be no allowance for a constable to 
ma~e a reaso ~aole mistake as to the state of the law . 
A consta~!e can be expected to krow the :aw hey see~ to 
enforce . Thus if sucn a ~istake is made, ~easonably and 
honestly (o r otherwise) , criminal an civil proceeaings 
can be taken by the arrestee. Presumably if the mistake 
was reas onable and honest , the penalty and/or damages 
would be minimal . 
The problems identified as resulting from arrests made 
under a qualified power necessitate that there no longer 
be a right to resist an arrest, lawful or unlawful , by 
a constable . ~hould the arrest be unlawful then criminal 
and/or civil proceedings can be taken by the arrestee. 
This cnange in the law would require a ' blind faith' on 
the arrestee's part in the constable, and a refusal to 
all ow the prosecution to make any insinuations from the 
acquiescence to the arrest . 
.. 
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A necessary corollary to this demise of an established 
right is that any evidence of any offence that is acquired 
as a r esult of an unlawful arrest is inadmissible as 
evidence . 
There is one exception to this denial of the right to 
r esist a r rest - unlawful 01 otherwise - that of the 
individual who believes that the arrestor is not a constable . 
The recent ' addition' to English law of a judicial review 
cf the motive for arrest has the attraction of a f~rther 
fettering of the extensive Police discretion in the use 
of arrest . Thus despite the fact that the language and 
concepts of ad ~lnis trative law appear alien within the 
context f summary law enforcement frocedLlres it is 
suggested a similar ap~roach has merit in ~Jew Ze aland . 
To ensure certainty , lawful ~otives should not na,e to be 
concluded post hoe from cour~ decisions . Thio ~uuld a:so 
impair tl:e ima ge o the cour:.;; as CE: int; ;., "':Jod_, inde 1,e:--cer~: 
from the ?olice . Consequently a ccncl sive list of 
lawful motives should be estab:isted whic~ to have the 
necessary aura of legitimacy , should. der:i.ve from the 
legislature ~ 
",(' th . d . ~ . . 2 2 . t . . 1 ·~· . e '.:! o t iv e s i e n t i 1 ::. ea , i i r,; po s s i o __ e to s u gr, e s : 
, . i-1 12 ~ ( aesira.; e ones _, . T':".eir· use ::iay sti~1 oe unls.\~ f·11 if 
the principles of .P& .. ~oc~_at?d ::-rrv::_r~c::.a· ?'st.~JI''? ·-:.-:t,;,~-;e ,, . 
Wednesbury Corporation are not satis ied' . 
(a) To ensure that the accused appears for trial : a lawful 
motive . 
(b) To enable ancilliary rights to be exercised by the 
Police against the suspect ; that such rights qxist upon 
arrest and not upon use of an alternative procedure , such 
as a ~ummons , causes arrest to be favoured as the means 
of initiating a criminal prosecution . As a motive this 
would be unlawful . As a coroll ary to arrest it is , of 
course , still acceptable . 
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(c ) To enable the suspect t o be identifi ed ; sho uld be a 
lawful motive if the constable has r ea sonable grounds f or 
s uspecting a falGe !lame and address have been provided , 
t hereby negatir.g the effective use of a summons o 
( d) To enabJ.e the Police to detain for questioning ; was 
a ccepted a[; a lawful motive in Holgate-_Mohammed , and would 
seem to be a necessary corollar y t o t he power to arres: 
on suspicion , that need not have been based on i ncrimin-
ating ev idence . 
(e) To allow the Police to prepare their case without 
hindrance from the accused ; a lawful motive . 
(f) To harass er punish the accused and intimidate others ; 
clearly not a lawf~l motive& 
(g) To prevent a suspect from undertaking further criminal 
acti~ities; depenoing on the nature of their offence , it 
could be a lawful motive . Where there is a need for a 
' coollng off 1 period in domestic or breach of the peace 
type situations iJ would be lawful . But if merely to d~ny 
so;1eono:-:: tte oppor .unity to commit crime - preventativ e 
de:ention - it would be unlawful. 
(h) To protect the accused; no matter how lauaa~l~ th~~ 
is , it ie still unlawful . If it is for protection rr~~ 
the accused's self , then possibly the ~ental HeaJth Act 
1969 pruceJures would be more appropriate . 
(i) ~o mar~ the serious nature of tje offe1ce allerdsd to 
have been cc~mitted; unless this is li~~ed with one of 
the above lawful motives this on ita own would arpear 
unlawful . Al though :his ,oes h.-1'!·? 1~ 6 i0lative backi.rig as 
a lawful motive . 
Anothe r aspect of reform is to improve the accountability 
of a.rrests . Thu::; should charges be pressed, the lawfulr.ess 
of the arrest should be considered as a matter of course 
by the court . This is r egardless of whether a guilty plea 
is entered or not . 
It is hoped that this might provide an effective check on 
the Police use of their extended powers , by removing the 
disincentive of having to specifically contend an arrest 
was unlawful . The burden would be shifted to the Police . 
J 
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To facilitat e possitie criminal or civil proceedings it is 
suggested that each arrestee be provided with a written 
acc o unt of their arrest, and its basis in law. 
Finally the offences termed ' marginal ' should have a mor e 
certain contento It is suggested that the concept of 
'breac·h of the peace ' which appears ta be a central tool 
of the Police 9 should lose its hybrid nature and become 
a s ubstantive offenc~. 
Such r eforms w~ll not ensure th~t the law entirely ~atches 
its current mystique , but will go some way towards 
narrowing the gap . To final]y rnarry the .wo aspects of 
the law - actuality and mystj_que - the propagation of 
mystique by the laws agents should be more attuned to its 
actual basis , which should incorporJte those desirablg 
aspects of the current mystique . 
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